The hard problem tells us that “physicalist” ontology is inadequate. There is no hard problem of consciousness for non-physicalists.
What I find surprising about the entire popular conversation is how many physicalists completely miss the point. They focus on providing a neuroscientific explanation, but that means they’ve already assumed physicalism is true.
They’ve ignored the hard problem, not solved it. The hard problem isn’t a scientific problem at all. It’s a discussion in philosophy of mind.
It’s only because people can’t drop their physicalist assumptions that they think neuroscience is even relevant.
Your title is an accurate rewording of the hard problem, but instead of a question we should say the hard problem of consciousness is - Neuroscience can't explain consciousness.
Maybe that would force the physicalists to tell us why we should believe it can, rather than endlessly speculating about different brain functions and correlations as if it was relevant.
I haven't read Solms' work, but it seems to me that when he says that damage to the reticular activating system can cause a cessation of consciousness, that what he *probably* means is that damage to that system results in an interruption of the *contents* of consciousness. Certainly, Buddhist and Vedantin theories of consciousness assert strongly that even in the deepest sleep (and I would imagine they would include states like comas or anesthesia here too) consciousness happens, even though it has no content—even though there are no phenomena presenting. Of course, this is tricky, as it will strike many as an unverifiable claim (though I take it that at least some Buddhists and Hindus believe they have direct experience that verifies this for themselves, subjectively) but it at least highlights an important difference between subjectivity as such and the objects of said subjectivity.
The hard problem tells us that “physicalist” ontology is inadequate. There is no hard problem of consciousness for non-physicalists.
What I find surprising about the entire popular conversation is how many physicalists completely miss the point. They focus on providing a neuroscientific explanation, but that means they’ve already assumed physicalism is true.
They’ve ignored the hard problem, not solved it. The hard problem isn’t a scientific problem at all. It’s a discussion in philosophy of mind.
It’s only because people can’t drop their physicalist assumptions that they think neuroscience is even relevant.
Your title is an accurate rewording of the hard problem, but instead of a question we should say the hard problem of consciousness is - Neuroscience can't explain consciousness.
Maybe that would force the physicalists to tell us why we should believe it can, rather than endlessly speculating about different brain functions and correlations as if it was relevant.
Typo: legions=>lesions
Thanks my man
I haven't read Solms' work, but it seems to me that when he says that damage to the reticular activating system can cause a cessation of consciousness, that what he *probably* means is that damage to that system results in an interruption of the *contents* of consciousness. Certainly, Buddhist and Vedantin theories of consciousness assert strongly that even in the deepest sleep (and I would imagine they would include states like comas or anesthesia here too) consciousness happens, even though it has no content—even though there are no phenomena presenting. Of course, this is tricky, as it will strike many as an unverifiable claim (though I take it that at least some Buddhists and Hindus believe they have direct experience that verifies this for themselves, subjectively) but it at least highlights an important difference between subjectivity as such and the objects of said subjectivity.