I haven't read part II yet, and it seems likely you will address this point, but:
To the extent that the FEP is meant to be a physicalist explanation for the arising of consciousness, I think it falls victim to one of the principal errors in physicalist philosophy of mind: a confusion of the contents of consciousness with consciousness itself.
Talk of self-regulation or self-observation as essential to a system's maintaining homeostasis is all well and good, but it's worth pointing out that a thermostat does this. And we need not invoke consciousness to explain the behavior of a thermostat (though of course panpsychists might do so). We can explain physical behavior—certainly the vast majority and maybe all of it—without reference to consciousness. But this also means that there is no way to simply point out behavior and somehow argue in the other direction, that such-and-such a behavior somehow causes consciousness.
And this difficulty is only exacerbated by the fact that any behavior we want to point to is itself only a phenomenon with, to, for, and/or as our own conscious experience itself: physical phenomena are only known to us as events within consciousness. And again, this brings us to the "hard" problem of consciousness, which FEP seems not only not to explain, but to simply ignore: note how the theory seems to begin by stating that all living systems already have "subjectivity" by their very nature. If "subjectivity" here is meant to refer to consciousness-as-such, then they have smuggled that in at the outset—begging the question. If, on the other hand, "subjectivity" here instead just means some kind of self-regulation, then it is nothing more than a sensor turned inwards, and this doesn't necessarily have anything to do with consciousness at all.
In short: there is no solution to the hard problem for physicalist philosophies of mind without explaining how a quantitative set of states can somehow generate qualitative states of phenomenal experience (note as well the casual reference to "qualitative" states in one of the quotes in Whiteley's piece—again, the FEP theorist here seems to smuggle in what needs to be proven or explained). FEP gets us no closer to such an account than any other physicalist theory of mind.
Well they argue that self-organising systems have "subjectivity" by definition because they have to self-monitor to maintain a low state of entropy. Whether the subsequent idea of affect solves the hard problem is questionable and is partly the subject of part II tomorrow (I don't think it does at all)
I'm not sure about the baseline point, they're not clear about how exactly the first organism to be conscious comes about precisely, which may be part of the issue, the second point is kind of addressed in tomorrow's article.
We act based on feelings, is that right? But how are feelings produced? Based on conceptual frameworks that encode self and other. So then, our feelings are constructed by the application of our thoughts about ourselves and the world to our sensual stimuli. So, maybe we really just act upon these underlying conceptual frameworks and only superficially on feelings?
What caught my eye was " a boundary between it and the environment" and where does that leave God? If our environment is 3-dimensions plus time, and there are indeed 11 dimensions, then perhaps there are entities that have no boundaries.
I haven't read part II yet, and it seems likely you will address this point, but:
To the extent that the FEP is meant to be a physicalist explanation for the arising of consciousness, I think it falls victim to one of the principal errors in physicalist philosophy of mind: a confusion of the contents of consciousness with consciousness itself.
Talk of self-regulation or self-observation as essential to a system's maintaining homeostasis is all well and good, but it's worth pointing out that a thermostat does this. And we need not invoke consciousness to explain the behavior of a thermostat (though of course panpsychists might do so). We can explain physical behavior—certainly the vast majority and maybe all of it—without reference to consciousness. But this also means that there is no way to simply point out behavior and somehow argue in the other direction, that such-and-such a behavior somehow causes consciousness.
And this difficulty is only exacerbated by the fact that any behavior we want to point to is itself only a phenomenon with, to, for, and/or as our own conscious experience itself: physical phenomena are only known to us as events within consciousness. And again, this brings us to the "hard" problem of consciousness, which FEP seems not only not to explain, but to simply ignore: note how the theory seems to begin by stating that all living systems already have "subjectivity" by their very nature. If "subjectivity" here is meant to refer to consciousness-as-such, then they have smuggled that in at the outset—begging the question. If, on the other hand, "subjectivity" here instead just means some kind of self-regulation, then it is nothing more than a sensor turned inwards, and this doesn't necessarily have anything to do with consciousness at all.
In short: there is no solution to the hard problem for physicalist philosophies of mind without explaining how a quantitative set of states can somehow generate qualitative states of phenomenal experience (note as well the casual reference to "qualitative" states in one of the quotes in Whiteley's piece—again, the FEP theorist here seems to smuggle in what needs to be proven or explained). FEP gets us no closer to such an account than any other physicalist theory of mind.
I agree, you've definitely anticipated the next part!
Interesting article, but does the theory explain why conscious perception would even need to emerge in the first place?
Well they argue that self-organising systems have "subjectivity" by definition because they have to self-monitor to maintain a low state of entropy. Whether the subsequent idea of affect solves the hard problem is questionable and is partly the subject of part II tomorrow (I don't think it does at all)
Very interesting stuff! Looking forward to the next posts. I had not read on FEP much before this. Two things that came up to me while reading this:
If we assume FEP is true, then would consciousness need a baseline before the first input to then be able to minimize free energy?
The minimization seems more like a guard rail then something that gives you purpose, otherwise status quo would be the happiest everyone would be.
Again, great read.
I'm not sure about the baseline point, they're not clear about how exactly the first organism to be conscious comes about precisely, which may be part of the issue, the second point is kind of addressed in tomorrow's article.
We act based on feelings, is that right? But how are feelings produced? Based on conceptual frameworks that encode self and other. So then, our feelings are constructed by the application of our thoughts about ourselves and the world to our sensual stimuli. So, maybe we really just act upon these underlying conceptual frameworks and only superficially on feelings?
What caught my eye was " a boundary between it and the environment" and where does that leave God? If our environment is 3-dimensions plus time, and there are indeed 11 dimensions, then perhaps there are entities that have no boundaries.